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ABSTRACT
The paper concerns representation intended as abstraction of a
model  from reality through  perception.  The  relation  between
reality and its model is a key issue to design because while the
project is thought on models, it always affects reality, and this
epistemological gap is the reason for many design failures.
In  particular,  models  are  adopted  in  top-down  approaches  to
abstract only what decision-makers consider useful information
to  pursue  their  objectives.  The  bottom-up  approach,  instead,
adopts as model reality itself intended as the total set of physical
stimuli  passed intact  to  agents  which  react  by spontaneously
transforming their environment.
This approach lacking representation proves itself automatically
reflexive  and  contingent.  Nevertheless  representations  which
make  top-down  approach  strategic  make  it  also  rigid  and
vulnerable to changing conditions.
The  present  paper  outlines  a  research  path  to  solve  this
contradiction  by  positing  that  the  two  approaches  are  not
mutually exclusive but the extremes of a scale which can work
as meta-model to regulate the relationship between reality and
model in design activity,  thus defining an intermediate design
object which would determine neither a passive nor an active
role  of  the  subject  with  regard  to  his  environment,  but  a
reciprocal encounter at the phenomenal level.
Keywords:  Design  Epistemology,  Design  Uncertainty,
Representation,  Top-down  Approach,  Bottom-up  Approach,
Affordance.
1. INTRODUCTION: ADDRESSING UNCERTAINTY BY
DESIGN
Representation is the main tool used in every domain to grasp
those aspects of reality which are interesting in  relation to  a
certain problem that must be addressed by any design activity:
the resulting selective abstraction is called model  and on the
basis  of  this  model  a  design  decision is  made.  Nevertheless,
there are problems which can be constructed from several points
of  view,  usually  complementary  ones.  These  problems  are
called ill-defined [13]. In its common use the term identifies a
particular  kind  of  problem,  mostly  concerning  complex
situations  involving  several  stakeholders  both  spatially  and
temporally, each of them bearing his particular point of view,
which is also open to future evolution. But uncertainty can be
considered  a  condition  of  contemporary  design  activity  in
general,  as the designer is provided with many alternatives due
to the increased availability of design approaches and technical
tools  to  meet  requirements.  Finally,  the  promotion  of
indeterminacy in the first steps of the design process, even when
dealing  with  potentially  well-defined  problems,  can  be  a
methodology to envision unexpected possibilities which could
not  be  considered  from  a  specific  perspective  eventually
adopted from the beginning [1]. 
A  different  type  of  representation  is  therefore  needed  to
encompass all the possible perspectives entailed by ill-defined
problems in an inclusive rather than selective way, contrary to
what  normally  occurs  in  the  case  of  scientific  models.  Of
course,  the  paper  does  not  aim at  criticizing  modelling  as  a
scientific tool: the question is rather if models which proved to
fulfil  scientific  problems can also fulfil  design ones,  and this
paper posits that the answer is negative. Indeed, since science
adopts  the  logic  of  'what-is'  while  design  adopts  the  one  of
'what-is-possible',  scientific  models  are  meta-representational,
i.e.  communicational  representations  of  a  cognitive
representation of the world, while design models should be pro-
presentational, i.e. representations of what does not exist yet but
which possibly might exist. What kind of model can represent
what could virtually exist in the nexus of possibilities wide open
in front of the designer?
The paper suggests that such a kind of representation would not
be  purposed  in  order  to  prevent  the  adoption  of  a  single
perspective  looking  at  a  specific  trajectory  and  would
consequently question the idea of representation as model itself.
This  representation  would  constitute  an  epistemic  boundary
object:  'epistemic'  in  the  sense  that  it  produces  disinterested
knowledge  and  'boundary'  in  the  sense  that  it  crosses
intersubjective gaps.
The  epistemic  boundary  object  has  meanings  which  are  not
unequivocally  attributed  but,  on  the  contrary,  which  can  be
freely  discovered  by the  subject  independently of  the  object
producer's  intentions.  Through  this  disjunction  between  the
object and any predetermined meaning, boundaries are crossed.
The  disjunction  can  only  take  place  at  the  phenomenal
dimension, i.e. the one concerning the way an object is present
to the subject (macroscopic level of description) rather than the
way  an  object  is  conceptually  or  materially  produced
(microscopic level of description).  Moreover, the phenomenal
dimension is the same one the subject will  assess the design
activity upon, i.e. on the basis of its outcome at the moment of
interaction, independently of practitioners' intentions.
The  single  object  enabling  the  subjective  knowledge  of  the
described  thing concerns the phase of  design  ideation,  while
design realization requires a series of technical representative
objects:  'technical' in the sense that they provide tools for an
objective  and  'representative'  in  the  sense  that  they  adopt  a
specific perspective.
These representations are models in a common sense and they
address a microscopic level of description, i.e. the procedures to
produce  the  design  object.  They  are  based  on  information
abstracting  only those  elements  which  are  necessary to  deal
with the specific technical issue of interest, and their meaning
must  be  unequivocally  attributed,  so  that  they  can  be  read
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exactly as the one who produced them expects them to be read,
usually according to conventions.
The  epistemic  boundary  object  and  technical  conventional
representations describe the same design object with different
roles within the design process. Indeed while the former is used
to  define  how the  design  object  must  result,  the  latter  must
describe how to produce this result. Therefore a meta-model is
needed to use these representations dynamically so that the level
of ideation and the one of production can be bridged. The two
levels and associated types of representation can be imagined as
occupying the two extremes of a scale of representations where
each step is characterized by a decreasing level of validity and
an  increasing  level  of  specificity  when  the  scale  is  covered
toward  the  representative  objects  starting  from the  boundary
object, while in the opposite direction each step is characterized
by an  increasing  level  of  validity  and  a  decreasing  level  of
specificity.
The  degree  of  validity  refers  to  the  amount  of  viewpoints  a
representation  can  contemporarily  encompass.  Since  validity
and specificity are inversely proportional, keeping the different
representations together is of uttermost importance.  Moreover
the  direction  to  cover  the  scale  must  be  from the  boundary
object  to  the  representative  objects,  because  the  latter  are
functional to the realization of the former.   
After this introductory description of the research framework,
the  paper  will  address  the  main  objectives  of  a  possible
investigation  related  to  the  meta-model:  the definition  of  the
epistemic  boundary  object  and  of  the  derivation  process  of
technical representative objects. But, first of all, the state of the
art related to the relationship between modelling and design will
be  briefly  reviewed,  with  a  specific  focus  on  the  ability  of
different approaches to integrate the users' many perspectives.
2. STATE OF THE ART: REPRESENTATION, DESIGN
AND PERCEPTION
Design failure can be defined as the difference between design
outcomes assessed once the design object is deployed in reality
and the outcomes expected during the object conception based
on representations  of  that  reality.  Therefore  the  proneness  of
different design practices to failure can be measured in terms of
the distance they entail between the design intentions on paper
and their actual outcomes, which directly depends on the degree
of modelling adopted by the specific  design practice.  Present
practices have been divided into three categories in relation to
this aspect: top-down approach, participatory design and open
design  paradigm.  These  practices  also  demonstrate  how
different degrees of modelling imply different roles of the users
in  the  design  process.  The  various  practices  have  been
subsequently  analysed  and  assessed  to  understand  how  the
previously outlined framework can improve them.
Top-down approach is characterized by the figure of a designer
without bias able to understand and represent the situation and
users' needs thus making decisions at their place. The user is
modelled as an ideal person defined in relation to the enjoyment
of a service or a good having a specific purpose. In this case
representation  is  supposed  to  completely comprehend reality,
and this belief leads to trust  representation to  the extent  that
reality in its contingency and multiplicity is totally ignored: the
distance between reality and its model is the greatest one.
Participatory design is based on the idea that decisions must be
made  through  consensus  upon  requirements,  objectives  and
assessment methods in order to deal with the designers' inability
or disinterest in reducing the distance with the ones affected by
their  decisions.  Therefore  the  user  becomes  an  actor,  i.e.  a
single  representative  of  a  whole  class  of  stakeholders
collectively engaged in a decision process. In this case reality is
approached in terms of multiplicity of perspectives addressed,
but in a specific instant decisions are made also for the future,
thus making permanent in the representation of the problem a
requirement that is contingent in reality. 
Open  design  paradigm  has  established  a  different  approach
promoting  the  gradual  emergence  of  a  design  object  starting
from a complete  but  light  meta-structure  which  evolves  over
time  so  that  it  can  adjust  itself  before  becoming  strong  and
robust  [2].  The  actor  becomes  an  agent,  i.e.  an  user  who
transforms the design object according to his evolving needs. In
this case, there is no representation in design activity and reality
itself is used directly as model: the distance between reality and
its model is the shortest one.
Every  previously mentioned  approach  is  characterized  by its
own degree of proneness to failure. Indeed the idea of an ideal
designer  as  in  the  case  of  the  top-down  approach  can  be
questioned because of the very narrow perspective adopted to
define the problem, so that the requirements and related solution
envisioned  by  the  designer  can  fail  to  meet  the  users'  need
especially when dealing with complex problems, such as big-
scale and long-term ones.
On  the  contrary,  the  participatory  approach  proposes  the
engagement of different stakeholders during the design process
to broaden the spectrum of  considered perspectives,  but  it  is
distorted  by  the  unquestioned  postulate  that  actors  are
transparent  to  themselves,  so that  they are able to assess the
consequences  of  their  decisions  and  to  forecast  their  future
needs. Actually, this is not the case of complex problems. 
Finally, the open design paradigm simply prevents the problem
of  how  making  decisions  by  leaving  the  design  object
unfinished so that agents can adjust it to conditions over time,
but  the  serial  addition  of  contingent  interventions  results  in
inconsistent  wholes.  Moreover,  once  the  design  object  has
become  robust,  it  cannot  be  adapted  anymore  unless  it  is
dismantled and reassembled again into a more fitting object.
There is still one way left to deal with the epistemological gap,
even if all the approaches among the ones covering the whole
range of distances between reality and its model proved to be
unsuccessful.  This  way is  to  transpose the problem from the
physical  to  the  phenomenal  dimension.  To  introduce  this
necessity, a fact must be pointed out: that in the evolution of the
concept of user from the actor to the agent, there is something
that persists, and this is the abstract distinction between the user
and the design object he uses, in the sense that the definition of
the former is not affected by any situated relationship with the
latter  and  vice  versa,  because  they  only  exist  as  physical
entities.  The consequence is that,  since the design object can
physically be only one, the way to address the growing amount
of  viewpoints  across  the  three  paradigms  is  to  define  future
users in terms which are increasingly generic, thus leading to a
growing level of indeterminacy related to the definition of the
design object too.
But on a concrete dimension the user and the design object are
complementary and defined together at a phenomenal level, i.e.
the one of situated perception and action. In this framework, the
design object can be used to influence the many in a same way,
thus reducing them to the specific definition of a single subject
or, contrarily, the design activity can be aimed at promoting the
many manifestations of a single design object in relation to the
subject.  The  following  section  will  concern  the  way  of
producing  such  a  phenomenal  openness  as  opposed  to  the
physical one.
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3. PROPOSAL: FROM MODEL/REALITY DUALISM TO
AFFORDANCES AND THINGS
The phenomenal dimension refers to the world as it is perceived
by a subject.
The classic idea of perception in design theory is based on a
very mediated concept of the relationship between the observer
and the design object where the object is a sort of text and the
observer is a reader. Phenomenal openness is here applied as the
multiplicity  of  textual  interpretations,  as  proposed  by  Colin
Rowe  with  regard  to  phenomenal  transparency  through  the
gestalt idea of multistability [12].
Instead an experiential approach considers perception as mainly
based  on  its  immediate  sensory  aspects,  by focusing  on  the
physical  properties an object is able to induce in  its  field of
action and which affect the state of the users in an unconscious
way. 
Both concepts are incomplete. The idea of perception as textual
reading ignores the very immediate and sensuous character of
perception associated to less intellectual activities. Moreover, it
assumes a shared code which is usually missing between the
user and the designer, and in any case the possible meanings are
reduced to the few controlled by the designer and allowed by
multistability.
Nevertheless,  the  idea  of  an  unconscious  sensory  relation
between users  and  design  objects  posits  at  the  centre  of  the
design activity the control of the users' behaviour, in the ways
studied by psychologist Kurt Lewin [9]. The more experience is
specified,  the  more  design  activity  assumes  a  constraining
stance  towards  users,  while  the  research  objective  is  not  to
reduce all  viewpoints  to  a single  one,  but on the contrary to
represent all the possible perspectives.  
The  mentioned  practices  are  based  on  two  extreme  theories
about perception which can actually be encompassed in order to
recovery  the  sensory  and  immediate  qualities  of  perception
without  losing  its  meaning,  which  is  a  mandatory  aspect  to
allow interpretation and therefore openness.
The classic idea is based on the mind-body dualism, a paradigm
positing that consciousness and the world exist independently of
each other and therefore objects have an identity and are out
there  to  be  recognized  by  the  observer  who  reads  a  sort  of
photograph projected in his head by the eye considered as  a
transparent lens. The other idea is based on the assumption that
there is no photograph to be read, that what we perceive is a set
of discrete stimuli passing through the optic nerve considered as
an opaque apparatus, and that objects do not exist in themselves
as they are only symbols which stand for sensation-complexes
[10]. Since objects are constructions depending on the subject,
this paradigm is called embodied model. 
Of  course  the  correct  understanding  of  the  way  perception
physiologically occurs is not the scope of this paper. What can
be  useful,  instead,  is  that  the  dichotomy between mind-body
dualism  and  the  embodied  model  parallels  the  dichotomy
between model and reality,  which can be also called by their
raw material, i.e. information and stimulation.
Indeed the usefulness  of these parallelisms is due to the fact
that, since information and stimulation are both valid forms of
knowledge  with  different  applicability,  the  two  theories  and
consequently the model-reality pair too appear not to exclude
each  other,  but  to  simply apply to  different  situations where
different cognitive activities are elicited, notably the upper ones
based on representations deriving from information processing
in the case of mind-body dualism and the lower ones based on
automatic  reflexes  due  to  stimulation  in  the  case  of  the
embodied model. The idea of lower and upper activities recalls
the  concept  of  a  scale,  thus  suggesting  the  idea  that  those
theories  exist  not  only together  but  also  in  continuity.  Henri
Bergson  recognized  this  continuity  when  studying  Leibniz's
monadology, i.e. a theory of oriented representations, together
with  experiments  concerning  hyperaesthesia,  i.e.  a  state  of
unmediated  perception  in  terms  of  chemical  and  physical
stimulation of perceptual organs [3]. His intuition constituted a
revolution in cognitive theories: while in the Cartesian tradition
partial  representation is the starting point to access reality by
means of an additive consciousness, Bergson posits that reality
is accessed in its entirety from the beginning by every observer
in  terms  of  stimulation  and  only  later  it  is  reduced  into
information  by  a  subtractive  consciousness,  thus  allowing
different understandings of life (levels of cognition) with regard
to the type of attention to life (levels of perception) required by
the specific activities observers are engaged in. 
These activities were scientifically organized into a scale by the
Piagetian  theory  of  cognitive  development,  which  associates
them to the developmental ages of the child [11].  Commons,
Crone-Todd & Chen extend the validity of this scale through
their  model  of  hierarchical  complexity,  where  activities  are
simply scored in terms of complexity occurring on the basis of
the situation a subject is engaged in independently of his age
[4].
The  scale  allows  to  encompass  the  extremes  of  mind-body
dualism  and  the  embodied  model  by  moving  them  towards
intermediate stages. There are two ways this can happen. The
first  one is  when representation makes objects  present to  the
subject  in  new ways  through  the  suspension  of  habit  which
degrades them into what Martin Heidegger terms 'thing' [8], i.e.
an object which loses its socially encoded value and then sets a
new object-subject  relation  which  is  not  given  a  priori.  The
second  way is  in  the  opposite  direction  and  consists  of  the
condensation of sensations affecting a situated subject into what
James  Gibson  terms  'affordance'  [6],  i.e.  the  suggestion  of
environmental  uses  in  relation  to  the  subject's  actual  need.
These  two  concepts  allow  to  overcome  the  limitations  of
representation due to preordained objectives and the limitations
of sensation due to its reflexive passiveness. A project thought
in terms of affordance or thing can only be designed through an
epistemic boundary object which is a thing itself (not purposed)
and  presenting  affordances  itself  (emergent  in  relation  to  a
subject).  This  leads to  the  substitution of a project  definition
based  on  objectives  and procedures  with  a  project  definition
addressing directly the result,  for  deriving  only later  how to
produce this result and why the properties of the form make the
different  perspectives  agree:  agreement  upon  form  does  not
require any other form of agreement [7].
Affordance  and  thing,  as  infinitesimally  distant  concepts
deriving from opposite directions, are between the sensorimotor
and the operative stages of the Commons' scale. Actually, the
scale  is  made  of  sixteen  stages,  but  for  the  present  paper
purposes we can group them into three main categories: formal
reasoning,  operational  activities  and  sensorimotor  reflexes.
Formal reasoning requires an absolute perception representing
from a single perspective many viewpoints in an abstract way,
operational  activities  are  based  on  a  customary  perception
perpetuating communal practices emerged from experience over
a  long  period  of  time,  sensorimotor  reflexes  depend  on  a
situated  perception  affecting  a  single  viewpoint  in  a  specific
way which would be the same for anyone exposed to the same
situation.
To sum up, the possible path to bridge the epistemological gap
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between  reality  and  its  model  is  to  address  the  phenomenal
dimension, where models and reality are substituted by things
and affordances: once the design object is ideated in terms of its
affordances by means of the epistemic boundary object, models
are used only later for its technical realization.
4. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A META-MODEL
Future research on this  topic  must  identify the nature  of  the
epistemic boundary object presenting affordances,  in order to
consequently derive  its  technical  representations  by covering
the gap between project conception and manifestation through
the idea of scale. 
The identification of the epistemic boundary object can follow
different lines.
1) The first one is the study of abstraction, i.e. the movement
from  stimulation  to  information,  in  order  to  understand  and
operate its mechanisms. These mechanisms consist in the ways
of selecting both the geometry and the cues of representation:
how can cues and geometry be used in an inclusive rather than
selective way?
2)  Abstraction  mechanisms  are  adopted  by  the  observer  in
relation  to  his  schemata,  i.e.  the  inner  model  which  he
unconsciously uses  to  interpret  the  environment.  The  factors
influencing these schemata are notably of individual,  cultural
and universal kind depending on the type of activity the subject
is  engaged  in  among  the  ones  categorized  by  Piaget,  i.e.
intellectual,  operative  and  automatic  respectively.  For  this
reason environmental psychology, geography of perception and
social psychology are disciplines related to the research: how
can schemata be suspended?
3) The last research line is related to the idea of presence as
opposed  to  the  idea  of  representation,  in  the  sense  that  the
medium would not concern information about something else
but  would  be  directly  meaningful  in  terms  of  the  stimuli  it
produces, which is the only way to stand for itself. Insights in
this direction can derive from the concept of sign as opposed to
symbol,  from semiotics  which  is  the  related  discipline,  from
Minimal  art  as  it  redefines  the  relationship  between  art  and
objecthood: how can a medium stand for itself?
The  derivation  process,  instead,  could  build  upon  the  Felix
Klein's architecture of geometries which is able to relate in a
sort of scale representations having different degrees of validity
as each of them adopts a specific geometry type which can be
converted into the geometry adopted by another representation
through a  series  of  transformations.  Indeed  in  Klein's  theory
different types of geometry are ordered hierarchically from the
bottom to the top as  the number of transformations  they are
invariant  to  grows.  For  instance  affine  geometry is  invariant
with regard to angles and therefore occupies a higher level than
euclidean geometry, while it is variant with regard to parallelity
and therefore occupies a lower level than projective geometry.
The  architecture  of  geometries  is  therefore  a  scale,  and  it  is
related  to  the  Piaget's  cognitive  scale,  i.e.  there  is  a
correspondence  between  the  environmental  cognition  by  the
subject  and  the  kind  of  geometry  the  subject  himself  would
adopt to represent that environment. Therefore it can be used to
understand  how  different  kinds  of  geometry  are  able  to
represent a varying amount of points of view, thus answering
the  question  related  to  the  characteristics  a  boundary  object
must possess, and then, by applying the transformations, it can
be also used to transform the single boundary object into the
many technical representations.
Here  the  scale  reveals  that  the  design  object  can  be  defined
neither in terms of the many abstract models representing the
many specific perspectives nor in terms of the single contingent
reality materially affecting the totality of subjects, but only in
terms  of  the  meta-model  bridging  the  gap  between  the  two
extremes. For Umberto Eco :'the object, to be defined, must be
transcended towards  the total  series  of  whom,  as  one of  the
possible  apparitions,  is  member.  In  this  sense  the  traditional
dualism between to be and to appear is substituted by a polarity
of finite and infinite, so that the infinite is located in the very
center of the finite' [5, p. 54]. 
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